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THE AMERICAN NEWS MEDIA,
TERRORISM, AND THE WAR IN IRAQ
DOUGLAS M. MCLEOD*

I. INTRODUCTION
Normative conceptions of the role that news media organizations should
play in democratic societies prescribe two related, yet at times contradictory,
functions for the press: (1) The news media should provide a forum for
competing ideas so that the public can make informed, intelligent decisions;
and (2) the news media should play an active role in ferreting out the truth.
The sad reality is that in the coverage of social conflicts, especially in the
aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, the media do an inadequate
job of performing either of these functions. In fact, the media may incorrectly
interpret and act on social conflicts in ways that are dysfunctional to conflict
dynamics, leading to tragic consequences.
To shed light on these processes, this Article begins by discussing
normative ideals for news media in democratic systems. These ideals are
most crucial during times of domestic and international conflict, which
especially illuminate the shortcomings of media practice. These deficiencies
are illustrated through the discussion of the role the media played during the
aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks and the build-up to the war
in Iraq. The American media‘s wholesale acceptance of Bush Administration
claims about al-Qaeda connections to the Iraqi government, as well as about
Iraq‘s alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) program, constitutes a
dereliction of duty. The mainstream media‘s failure to thoroughly investigate
these claims contributed to public misconceptions about Iraq, and paved the
way for what, in retrospect, has been largely acknowledged as both a human
tragedy and a foreign policy disaster for the United States. This Article
provides a discussion of some of the systemic explanations for this failure,
followed by an assessment of what became of these normative journalistic
ideals. In turn, the discussion moves to a consideration of how current media
practices impact the nature of social conflict, and concludes with a proposal
for how media practice could be improved.
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II. JOURNALISTIC IDEALS IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS
Based on centuries of philosophical and political writings on the basic
normative principles of democratic systems, as well as on the research
literature on journalistic practices, Michael Gurevitch and Jay Blumler
proposed eight normative standards for mass media systems in democratic
societies: (1) the surveillance of relevant events; (2) the identification of key
issues; (3) the provision of platforms for advocacy; (4) the transmission of
diverse political discourse; (5) the scrutiny of institutions and officials; (6) the
activation of informed participation; (7) the maintenance of media autonomy;
and (8) the consideration of audience potential.1 Although the significance of
all of these normative ideals is accentuated during times of social conflicts—
as they involve ways in which the media can help ensure that social conflicts
stimulate progressive social change rather than divisive social decay—five of
these ideals are particularly germane to this discussion.
First, the media play a role in publicizing important events and in bringing
significant issues to the public agenda. In this way, they are part of the
―surveillance‖ function of the press identified by Harold Lasswell.2 As part of
this surveillance function, the media do more than just provide a conduit for
information; they play an important gatekeeping role in determining the
relative importance of events and issues by judging their potential impact on
society. But the media not only assess inherent importance, they must also
take into account that the citizens they serve attach very different values to the
importance of events and issues. These judgments are complex under ideal
conditions, and are only further complicated by the current budgetary crisis
that confronts most mainstream media, resulting in dwindling resources to
provide surveillance. These constraints have increased the pressure to rely on
official sources for ―information subsidies‖ in the interest of economic
efficiency. Economic pressures also have led to more efficient news styles
that emphasize ―infotainment,‖ ―personality journalism,‖ ―pseudo-events,‖
―soft news,‖ and ―talk show politics.‖
When it comes to social conflicts, the media must not only highlight key
events and issues, they should also seek to identify various interested parties,
stakeholders, and positions. They should put these conflicts into context and
reveal the forces that shape circumstances and outcomes, as well as evaluate
possibilities for equitable resolutions to conflicts. All too often, such
decisions are not made in a balanced and impartial way, but are subject to the

1. Michael Gurevitch & Jay G. Blumler, Political Communication Systems and Democratic
Values, in DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS MEDIA 269–270 (Judith Lichtenberg ed., 1990).
2. Harold D. Lasswell, The Structure and Function of Communication in Society, in THE
COMMUNICATION OF IDEAS: A SERIES OF ADDRESSES 37–38 (Lyman Bryson ed., 1948).
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influence of power within the social system.3 Moreover, issues are often laid
out in episodic, decontextualized, and ahistorical ways.4 As such, media
agenda-setting may not take place in a meaningful and constructive manner,
and may be more influential in replicating existing conditions rather than in
fostering progressive change.
Such criticism of the media extends to the normative ideal of scrutinizing
social institutions and government officials; the cherished image of the news
media as watchdogs has been threatened by the lack of resources available for
investigative reporting. The demise of the ―fourth estate‖ has been
underscored by recent crises and controversies stemming from government
and business institutions that have operated virtually unchecked by
investigative journalism. Moreover, the limited investigative reporting that
remains may be focused too low in the chain of offenses, or may be focused
too much on problematic individuals than on more systemic causes. This
fundamental attribution of error may be especially limiting when it comes to
the resolution of conflicts; it highlights individual scapegoats in a way that
may intensify conflicts and deflects attention away from the systemic roots of
problems that may hold the key to potential solutions, all the while fostering
public cynicism that poisons the conflict atmosphere.
Positive conflict outcomes are facilitated by the richness of the
marketplace of ideas as provided by the media. Ideally, the media provide
platforms for a variety of ideas and viewpoints to be disseminated to the
concerned citizenry and, through the process of public sifting and winnowing,
the best ideas ultimately will prevail. In practice, the marketplace is skewed
in favor of official interests, whose voices often come across loudest in
conflict situations. Rather than amplify the voices and perspectives of the
disenfranchised groups and citizens who need amplification most, the media
often serve those who need it least. This skew is legitimized by news routines
that are organized around institutions of power.5 It is reinforced by the
ideologies of objectivity and press autonomy that tend to filter out nonmainstream ideas, as the media hesitates to give platforms to challengers,
critics, and radicals out of concern that they would appear as advocates with
an axe to grind. On the other hand, media organizations do report official
opinions without thinking twice. The result is that citizens may be rather
close-minded toward alternative perspectives and lower status groups in

3. J. HERBERT ALTSCHULL, AGENTS OF POWER: THE MEDIA AND PUBLIC POLICY 155 (2d ed.
1995).
4. SHANTO IYENGAR, IS ANYONE RESPONSIBLE? HOW TELEVISION FRAMES POLITICAL ISSUES
15 (1991).
5. LEON V. SIGAL, REPORTERS AND OFFICIALS: THE ORGANIZATION AND POLITICS OF
NEWSMAKING 4 (1973).
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conflict situations.6
Such practices translate into reduced diversity in political discourse, and
thus fail to satisfy another normative ideal. Diverse, multilateral discussion
among relevant parties is essential for functional social conflict. However,
there is considerable concern that the media provide only a limited discourse,
―bounded politically by the two-party system, economically by the
imperatives of private enterprise capitalism, and culturally by the values of a
consumer society.‖7 Groups outside the mainstream are treated as ―deviant.‖8
As a result, citizens lack awareness—much less understanding—of political
alternatives, and may fail to recognize and articulate their own interests. In
the process, the marketplace of ideas is narrowed and opportunities for
successful conflict resolution are diminished.
As noted by researchers and media critics alike, the media often fall far
short of these democratic standards. Gurevitch and Blumler suggest that four
major obstacles hamper the media‘s ability to live up to these normative
goals. First, in certain situations, these ideals may be contradictory.9 For
example, the goal of providing a forum for diverse viewpoints may become
problematic when the facts suggest that a particular viewpoint is correct and
others are not. Second, the agenda and perspectives purveyed by the elite
communicators who dictate the media agenda may disenfranchise common
citizens.10 Third, many citizens in a free, democratic society may choose to
be politically disengaged.11 Finally, social, political, and economic conditions
may inhibit the media‘s pursuit of these democratic ideals.12
When it comes to social conflicts, we may collapse five of the
aforementioned normative ideals into two: (1) the representation of the
diverse viewpoints of various parties to the conflict (which combines the
ideals of the provision of platforms for advocacy and the transmission of
diverse political discourse), and (2) the necessity of evaluating these various
viewpoints and rendering decisions in light of the preponderance of facts—the
process of getting to the truth (which combines the ideals of providing
surveillance of relevant events, the identification of key issues, and the
6. Douglas M. McLeod & James K. Hertog, Social Control, Social Change and the Mass
Media’s Role in the Regulation of Protest Groups, in MASS MEDIA, SOCIAL CONTROL, AND SOCIAL
CHANGE: A MACROSOCIAL PERSPECTIVE 305, 319 (David Demers & K. Viswanath eds., 1999).
7. Gurevitch & Blumler, supra note 1, at 269.
8. Douglas M. McLeod & James K. Hertog, The Manufacture of ‘Public Opinion’ by
Reporters: Informal Cues for Public Perceptions of Protest Groups, 3 DISCOURSE & SOCIETY 259,
260 (1992). See, e.g., TODD GITLIN, THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING: MASS MEDIA IN THE
MAKING & UNMAKING OF THE NEW LEFT 32 (1980).
9. Gurevitch & Blumler, supra note 1, at 270–71.
10. Id. at 271.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 272.
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scrutiny of institutions and officials).
Not only are these normative ideals most crucial when societies are
engaged in domestic or international conflicts, but such conflicts also provide
excellent opportunities to evaluate the media‘s performance with regard to
these normative ideals. Toward that end, this Article now presents a case
study of media coverage of one such conflict: the 2003 decision by the United
States to go to war against Iraq. By examining the nature of news content of
this conflict, we can evaluate the performance of the media and whether they
lived up to these normative ideals.
III. AN ASSESSMENT OF MEDIA PERFORMANCE
Evidence for this case study is provided by an examination of the
transcripts of the CNN and Fox News coverage of the conflict over U.S.
policy toward Iraq during the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, which led to the war in Iraq that began on March 20, 2003.13 This
conflict was chosen because it exemplifies a period of high-visibility conflict
that had broad-sweeping social and political ramifications. The analysis
focuses on two particular aspects of this coverage: the Bush Administration‘s
contentions about alleged al-Qaeda connections to the Iraqi government and
its contentions regarding the presence of WMDs in Iraq. These charges,
which were brought by the Bush Administration against Saddam Hussein and
his former Iraqi government, were instrumental in providing justification for
the U.S. attack on and ultimate occupation of Iraq, which has now lasted more
than six years. Throughout this period, these charges remained at the core of
the official U.S. policy rationale for the country‘s actions in the Iraq conflict,
though neither allegation has ever been substantiated.
In fact, the bipartisan September 11 Commission dismissed the Bush
Administration‘s often-repeated contentions about an alleged connection
between the Iraqi government and al-Qaeda.14 The report refuted Vice
President Dick Cheney‘s claim of ―overwhelming‖ evidence of a ―longestablished‖ link between Saddam and al-Qaeda.15 The report noted that the
Iraqi government had rejected overtures from Osama bin Laden in 1994 and
1996.16 The report also refuted other claims by the Bush Administration
about the al-Qaeda connection, including Cheney‘s assertion that September

13. David E. Sanger & John F. Burns, Bush Orders Start of War on Iraq; Missiles Apparently
Miss Hussein, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2003, at A1.
14. Walter Pincus & Dana Milbank, Al Qaeda-Hussein Link Is Dismissed, WASH. POST,
June 17, 2004, at A1.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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11th attacker Mohamed Atta had met with Iraqi officials in Prague in 2000.17
In the process of interrogating detained al-Qaeda members Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed and Abu Zubaydah, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
waterboarded them 83 and 183 times respectively to collect information about
al-Qaeda operations.18 One of the primary directives of Bush Administration
officials was to seek information about linkages to Iraq.19 Though these
interrogations revealed information (some of which was of questionable
validity) about potential al-Qaeda attacks, the detainees provided no
information about any linkages to Iraq.20 A general consensus has emerged
that Bush Administration assertions about the al-Qaeda connection were at
best misinformed—and, at worst, intentionally disingenuous—in an attempt to
justify the invasion of Iraq.
The claim regarding WMDs in Iraq has been similarly debunked. No
WMDs were found, much less used, in Iraq, when U.S. troops invaded and
toppled Saddam Hussein‘s government. In his book, The Way of the World: A
Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism, Pulitzer Prize-winning
journalist Ron Suskind presented evidence that, prior to the U.S. invasion of
Iraq, the Bush Administration had intelligence information that Iraq did not
possess WMDs, chose to ignore that information, and, in fact, was complicit
in manufacturing evidence in the form of a forged memo from the head of
Iraqi intelligence.21 Again, a clear consensus has emerged that the Iraqi
government did not possess WMDs as claimed by the Bush Administration.
This analysis focuses on the period surrounding U.S. Secretary of State
Colin Powell‘s speech to the U.N. Security Council on February 5, 2003.22
Powell laid out the case for military action against Iraq based on arguments
about the Iraqi links to al-Qaeda and Iraq‘s possession of chemical, nuclear,
and biological WMDs.23 In the process, he showed aerial photographs of
buildings and trucks that were alleged to be used for manufacturing biological
weapons.24 He also noted that Saddam Hussein ―has made repeated covert
attempts to acquire high-specification aluminum tubes‖ for use in making

17. Id.
18. Scott Shane, Waterboarding Used 266 Times on 2 Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2009, at
A1.
19. See James Risen, No Evidence of Meeting with Iraqi, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2004, at A14;
Philip Shenon, C.I.A. Warned White House that Links Between Iraq and Qaeda Were ‘Murky’, N.Y.
TIMES, July 10, 2004, at A7.
20. Shenon, supra note 19.
21. RON SUSKIND, THE WAY OF THE WORLD: A STORY OF TRUTH AND HOPE IN AN AGE OF
EXTREMISM 181–84 (2008).
22. Live Event/Special (CNN television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003).
23. Id.
24. Id.
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nuclear weapons.25
Prior to Powell‘s speech, there was no broad public consensus about
whether to go to war with Iraq, nor was there a consensus among experts
regarding Bush Administration assertions about the al-Qaeda linkage or about
WMDs. In retrospect, neither the alleged connection between al-Qaeda and
Iraq, nor Iraq‘s alleged possession of WMDs, has survived. However, at the
time, Powell‘s presentation was very persuasive and played an integral role in
providing the impetus for war.
For many Americans, this was a pivotal moment in terms of whether or
not to support the escalation of the conflict in Iraq. It came at a time when the
American public was considering whether the United States should allow
more time for weapons inspections and sanctions to deal with Iraq, or whether
it should take more direct action. As most Americans had no first-hand
experience that they could use to make up their own minds regarding
al-Qaeda connections and WMDs in Iraq, they were largely dependent on how
these issues were portrayed in the media. Americans‘ knowledge was based
not only on televised coverage of Powell‘s presentation itself, but also on the
nature of media coverage leading up to his speech, as well as the post-event
spin included with this coverage.
This analysis focuses on media coverage surrounding Powell‘s speech to
assess how the media treated these two crucial issues of the al-Qaeda linkage
and WMDs. CNN and Fox News were chosen because they are two of the
most important sources of news information for many Americans, and they
provide a decent bellwether to indicate how these events were covered,
digested, and packaged for mass consumption.
The questions for this analysis are: How did CNN and Fox News report
these two Bush Administration claims during the period leading up to the
invasion of Iraq, to what extent did they provide countervailing viewpoints
and evidence, and at what point did they begin to draw conclusions based on a
preponderance of evidence? Ultimately, the results will be used to assess
media performance with regard to the aforementioned normative standards in
the context of this dispute.
To answer these questions, this analysis includes all transcripts for CNN
and Fox News programs for the week surrounding Powell‘s speech (February
1, 2003 to February 8, 2003) that contained either the phrases ―al-Qaeda‖ or
―weapons of mass destruction‖ within ten words of the terms ―Saddam
Hussein‖ or ―Iraq.‖ For this Article, qualitative examples that were either
typical or particularly illustrative were isolated for discussion.

25. Id.
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A. Coverage of Colin Powell’s Speech to the U.N. Security Council
Prior to Powell‘s appearance, television pundits set the stage by posing the
question of whether Powell would present the ―smoking gun‖ in terms of
evidence against Iraq. During Fox News Sunday, host Tony Snow asked the
roundtable panelists, ―Colin Powell is going to give a speech to the United
Nations Wednesday. He evidently is going to present some new evidence
regarding Iraq and weapons of mass destruction. How important is it?‖26
Mara Liasson responded,
Well, it‘s very important because there are countries
saying we‘re waiting to hear this, if the evidence is
compelling, we‘re going to be with the United States. I think
there are some countries who would like to be with the
United States and have a way to explain to their own
domestic populations who are against the war why they are
[supporting the U.S.].
....
. . . You‘re not going to have some kind of a smoking
gun, where there are pictures that are so incredibly dramatic
and shocking.27
Bill Kristol, political commentator and Republican strategist, declared
with confidence, ―Powell is going to show that there are loaded guns
throughout Iraq. And what he will then say is, ‗We cannot allow them to
become smoking guns.‘‖28
Journalists imbued Powell‘s speech with critical importance in
determining both international and domestic support for intervention in Iraq,
as typified by this CNN report:
In many countries around the world, Colin Powell
perhaps is the most respected figure in this Bush
Administration for making the case on Iraq. As for American
citizens, well, the latest CNN/USA Today poll, Gallup poll,
shows on the importance of Powell‘s presentation of
evidence, 60 percent of the people say it‘s very important, 27
percent say what Powell‘s presentation will be, 27 percent on
somewhat important, 12 percent saying not important at all.29

26.
27.
28.
29.

Fox News Sunday (Fox News television broadcast Feb. 2, 2003).
Id.
Id.
American Morning with Paula Zahn (CNN television broadcast Feb. 4, 2003).
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The day of Powell‘s speech, reporters such as CNN‘s Dana Bash were
brimming with excitement and anticipation:
[T]he [S]ecretary‘s presentation, we are told, will be about a
90-minute-long presentation, audio, video, really a
multimedia presentation the likes of which the U.N. hasn‘t
seen in quite some time. And the main thrust of Secretary
Powell‘s presentation will be to show officials at the U.N.
that Iraq is, first of all, has weapons of mass destruction and
second of all, is hiding them from the inspectors . . . .
....
. . . Secretary Powell along with a lot of folks here at the
White House have been sifting through mountains, really
mountains of intelligence, classified information that they say
really does show that Iraq is, has weapons of mass destruction
. . . .30
Here, Bash substantiates the notion that Powell‘s testimony is grounded in
fact, rather than supplemented by ideology in a rush to judgment.
Not only was Powell‘s testimony broadcast live, but portions of it were
replayed throughout the following days. Video clips from the speech were
often used to lead into news stories and panel discussions, and were often
integrated into the discussions. As such, regular CNN viewers were treated to
repeated excerpts of the Powell speech.
In general, Powell‘s presentation was met with rave reviews from a
variety of journalists who appeared as talk show panelists. For example, Mort
Zuckerman of U.S. News & World Report stated,
Well, he was very good. He spoke in a measured tone.
He has great credibility. And the fact that it was Colin
Powell, who was perceived by many in America and many in
the world as the most skeptical about the American approach
to Iraq, was very, very important. He has enormous
credibility and enormous charisma, and he was foursquare
now behind what the president [said].31
The Washington Post‘s Bob Woodward said on CNN that Powell‘s
presentation ―obviously was very strong. . . . [W]hen you put it all together
the accumulation was profound. . . . And as Powell said, there was no
smoking gun. My assistant who looked at it, who‘s a lot younger said,
30. American Morning with Paula Zahn (CNN television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003).
31. The O’Reilly Factor (Fox News television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003).
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‗Maybe no smoking gun, but there‘re [sic] shell casings all over the floor.‘‖32
Fox News reports presented the viewpoints of numerous Republican and
Democratic Senators who lauded Powell‘s performance. Democratic Senator
Joe Biden said: ―I think Secretary Powell made a very powerful and, I think,
irrefutable case today.‖33 Republican Senator Richard Lugar called the
testimony ―extremely powerful.‖34 Democratic Senator Joe Lieberman was
quoted as saying that the speech was ―compelling, convincing, and chilling.‖35
Democratic Senator Tom Daschle remarked, ―The methodical way in which
the [S]ecretary laid out his case was effective and I‘m sure added his ability to
build the coalition that we have advocated now for several months.‖36
Fox News commentator Bill O‘Reilly reinforced this portrayal of
bipartisan support:
Here in the United States, Secretary Powell‘s speech was
generally a success. Even dovish congressmen like Al C.
Hastings of Florida admit Mr. Powell made a very persuasive
case that Iraq is violating U.N. Resolution 1441.
A few Democrats, most notably Nancy Pelosi and Ted
Kennedy, nitpicked the speech, but clear thinking Americans
know the gig is up for Saddam. He‘s violated the U.N.
mandate.
It‘s interesting because none of the Democratic
presidential candidates said very much because they know
most Americans support President Bush.37
Moreover, O‘Reilly characterized the speech as swaying the official
policy of other nations: ―[O]verseas, opposition to removing Saddam is
shrinking. Germany and France are on the defensive, China is wishy-washy
and Russia is on board.‖38
The media also depicted foreign dignitaries as supporting Powell. In one
Fox News interview, Israeli Foreign Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said,
I thought he made a very compelling and truthful case. I
think he exposed the nature of the Iraqi regime, its deceptions
and all the attempts it is making to conceal the fact that it is
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003).
Lou Dobbs Moneyline (CNN television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003).
Special Report with Brit Hume (Fox News television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003).
Id.
Id.
The O’Reilly Factor, supra note 31.
Id.
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building weapons of mass destruction, its connections to
terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. I think this was a powerful
case, powerfully made.39
B. Coverage of the Al-Qaeda Connection
Journalists largely believed Powell‘s contention regarding al-Qaeda
operations in Iraq. For example, CNN national security correspondent David
Ensor concluded,
So there you have it, and you saw George Tenet, the
director of Central Intelligence, sitting behind Colin Powell
as he made those statements. In the past, intelligence officers
in the U.S. have expressed some skepticism about the ties. I
am now talking to them. They‘re saying the evidence is
stronger and stronger, and you see this group, they say, still
operating in Baghdad, still moving money, supplies, and
personnel in and out of Iraq that is loyal to Zarqawi and
al-Qaeda.40
Ensor summarized Powell‘s presentation with respect to Iraq‘s ties to
terrorism by stating,
There was high drama in the satellite pictures and
intercepted conversations. But the most significant new
assertions from Secretary Powell concern Iraq‘s ties with
terrorists. And come from multiple sources, officials say, that
simply could not be revealed.
Evidence of connections between Saddam Hussein and
Osama bin Laden‘s al-Qaeda, through this man, Abu Mousab
al-Zarqawi, the al-Qaeda figure who Powell said spent two
months in Baghdad last year.41
CNN international correspondent Sheila MacVicar further summarized
Powell, saying,
Secretary of State Powell called the relationship between
Iraq and al-Qaeda a—quote—―sinister nexus‖ and said this
man was the link.
....
39. Your World with Neil Cavuto (Fox News television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003).
40. Live Event/Special, supra note 22.
41. Lou Dobbs Moneyline, supra note 33.
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Powell said this camp in Northern Iraq was established by
Zarqawi‘s networks for training in poisons. He says that
although it was an area not controlled by Saddam Hussein‘s
government, a senior agent representing Baghdad had offered
al-Qaeda safe haven in the region. And Powell claimed that
Zarqawi had established a network of two dozen men in
Baghdad last summer while he was getting medical treatment
there.42
When journalists reiterated elements of Powell‘s speech, they rarely, if ever,
treated his contentions as anything other than established fact.
Politicians made frequent appearances supporting Powell‘s assertion about
the al-Qaeda connection. For example, Republican Senator Pat Roberts
commented to CNN‘s Wolf Blitzer on Powell‘s speech,
That caught the attention of the American people. And it says
the [sic] al-Qaeda, who are in Iraq, have a cell in Baghdad
and have basically a poison center and they are educating and
training and are going to dispense those kinds of biological
weaponry or say chemical weaponry and it can go to Europe,
it can go to the United States. Finally the American people
say, ―Hey, we‘ve got a problem. We got to take care of
this.‖43
Reaction in support of Powell‘s contentions included that of foreign
dignitaries such as Romanian Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana:
I think it was persuasive, and I think the whole case that
Secretary Powell made today was pretty credible.
Again, I think he made an extremely strong impression on
all of us, and I think that there is compelling evidence that
Hussein and his regime have a tactic for deceit for decades
and I think Secretary Powell made a strong impression and
the al-Qaeda connection was forceful as well.44
From news depictions of international reactions, a viewer would think that the
world was solidly behind U.S. intervention in Iraq.
Concern about the Iraqi role in international terrorism was enhanced by
CNN reports of government surveillance of various individuals within the
42. Newsnight with Aaron Brown (CNN television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003).
43. Wolf Blitzer Reports (CNN television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003).
44. The Big Story with John Gibson (Fox News television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003).
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United States. Kelli Arena reported:
Sources say the FBI has a handful of individuals in the
United States who are believed to be Iraqi intelligence
officers under surveillance, along with hundreds of Iraqi
sympathizers. Sources say the FBI has not found evidence of
any active terror cells in the [United States], but point out
there is a danger individuals may act on their own.45
C. Coverage of the Issue of Weapons of Mass Destruction
In covering the issue of WMDs, news reports often centered around
statements by President Bush and high-level Bush Administration officials.
For example, several stories on Fox News led with a video clip of President
Bush making a definitive statement on this issue:
We know that our enemies have been working to acquire
weapons of mass destruction. That is a fact.
If their ambitions were ever realized, they would set out
to inflict catastrophic harm on the United States with many
times the casualties of September the 11th.
So we‘re going to do everything in our power to protect
the people and to prevent that day from ever happening.46
This clip set up host Greta Van Susteren‘s panel discussion with three
retired military officers, which was in anticipation of Powell‘s speech and was
predicated on the assumption that Iraq possessed such weapons.
White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer backed up Colin Powell
immediately before Powell‘s speech:
Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction, particularly
chemical and biological weapons. And of course, the
President agrees with what Colin Powell has written.
....
I think the reason that we know that Saddam Hussein possesses
chemical and biological weapons is from a wide variety of means.
That‘s how we know.47
After Powell‘s speech, reporters repeated his statements in a way that lent
credibility to them as established facts. For example, Fox News senior White

45. Wolf Blitzer Reports, supra note 43.
46. On the Record with Greta Van Susteren (Fox News television broadcast Feb. 3, 2003).
47. Live Event/Special (CNN television broadcast Feb. 3, 2003).
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House correspondent Jim Angle noted,
In a multimedia presentation unveiling a range of newly
declassified intelligence, Powell delivers a scathing
indictment of Iraq‘s weapons programs and efforts to conceal
them from inspectors. What he called irrefutable and
undeniable evidence. For instance, Powell played intercepted
conversations between Iraqi military officers in which they
talk about getting rid of the evidence before an expected visit
from inspectors.48
In this report, Angle repeatedly summarized the evidence as laid out by
Powell.49 Similarly, CNN‘s Andrea Koppel stated, ―Using charts and
graphics, Powell said the [United States] believes Iraq has at least seven
mobile biological agent factories mounted on at least eighteen trucks.‖50
Again, the journalists provided little, if any, reason to doubt Powell‘s
assertions.
The talk show panelists on both CNN and Fox News were adamant in
their affirmation of Powell‘s testimony. For example, when David Gergen
(who appeared on both CNN and Fox News) was asked whether Powell
delivered the smoking gun, he responded, ―He sure had everything but the—
but the bullet itself. It was conclusive, compelling evidence. . . . He
demolished the argument that Saddam Hussein is not concealing weapons of
mass destruction.‖51
Rather than turn to only journalists and politicians, CNN also sought
comment from technical experts. For example, former United Nations
weapons inspector Terence Taylor said, ―Well, I think it will be
extraordinarily difficult to contradict this evidence. When you connect it all
together, it‘s a whole body of evidence.‖52 Ken Pollack, a former CIA
analyst, commented,
I was actually struck by both how conservative they were. I
think Colin Powell picked the evidence that he showed to
make sure that it could really be substantiated . . . . That said,
there is far, far more evidence out there. I think that the great
success of Colin Powell‘s presentation is I think he made an
incredibly compelling case using just the limited amount that
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Special Report with Brit Hume, supra note 34.
Id.
Connie Chung Tonight (CNN television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003).
Id.
Live Event/Special, supra note 22.
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he actually showed.
....
. . . I think the imagery showing some of these sites,
demonstrating that the Iraqis clearly have chemical weapons
in them, the decontamination vehicles, the signature
vehicles.53
Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made a call for action against Iraq,
treating WMDs as an established fact:
Iraq is a country in the middle of the region from which
the terrorists that attacked New York and Washington came.
From the middle of the region which financed and feeds
terrorist networks.
And are we going to say we‘re going to sit there and let
weapons of mass destruction pile up in a country that has
already used them against its neighbors and its own people,
against which we fought a war ten years ago and which has,
without any dispute, flagrantly violated all the agreements
they made in 1991?54
The most prominent source of opposition in the coverage was the Iraqi
government itself (including Saddam Hussein), which was cited by both CNN
and Fox News as denying both the general allegations of the Bush
Administration and Powell‘s testimony specifically. CNN Iraq correspondent
Nic Robertson reported that ―reaction to Colin Powell‘s words or the potential
for what he‘s going to say, which has been reported here, or at least picked up
by Iraqi officials [is] that they say it‘s a fabrication. They believe the satellite
images that he‘ll use will be a fabrication.‖55
CNN also acknowledged Iraqi media as refuting claims about WMDs.
Robertson noted,
[R]eaction in the newspapers here [in Iraq] to President
Bush‘s meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair,
saying that everything that President Bush had to say about
Iraq‘s weapons of mass destruction was lies, and
characterizing Tony Blair, the British prime minister, as an
attendant to the United States, saying that he‘d humiliated his
country, that the U.N. weapons inspectors here had proved
53. Id.
54. The Big Story with John Gibson, supra note 44.
55. American Morning with Paula Zahn (CNN television broadcast Feb. 3, 2003).
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everything Prime Minister Tony Blair had said was lies.56
The audience likely discounted denials from Iraq, especially in light of the
Bush Administration‘s repeated characterizations of Iraq as being part of the
―axis of evil.‖ Outside the Iraqi government and media, opposition to the
Bush Administration was relatively faint in news coverage leading up to the
invasion of Iraq. United Nations chief weapons inspector Hans Blix made
several appearances, but mainly to say that Iraq, though cooperative with
United Nations weapons inspections, was not fulfilling its obligation to
disarm.57 However, Blix presented no direct evidence of WMDs.58
When former President Jimmy Carter questioned whether the Bush
Administration had made an adequate case regarding WMDs, he was soundly
lambasted by Fox News host Sean Hannity:
Jimmy Carter is a great former president, building houses,
he‘s done some good work. He‘s now becoming a menace in
his constant, almost daily criticism of President Bush and his
efforts to try to undermine him, which he‘s trying to do here.
And what bothers me, his record now comes into play, and on
foreign affairs it was a disaster, because we know Iran
became a terrorist regime, took our guys hostages.59
When the discussion on Fox News turned to the issue of whether the Bush
Administration was exaggerating the threat of WMDs to advance its intention
to go to war with Iraq, Fox News correspondent Major Garrett made an
analogy to the Cuban Missile Crisis:
[T]here is one striking similarity. Back in 1962, many
European countries though[t] the U.S. was exaggerating the
threat in Cuba because it was obsessed with Fidel Castro.
Many of the same countries think the U.S. is exaggerating the
threat with Iraq because it is obsessed with Saddam Hussein.
Adlai Stevenson proved the Europeans wrong then. It will be
a major goal of Secretary of State Colin Powell tomorrow.60
Commentator Fred Barnes noted that even the French government, which

56. Saturday Morning News (CNN television broadcast Feb. 1, 2003).
57. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Bush Was Set on Path to War, Memo by British Adviser Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2006, at A1.
58. Id.
59. Hannity & Colmes (Fox News television broadcast Feb. 3, 2003).
60. Special Report with Brit Hume (Fox News television broadcast Feb. 4, 2003).
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is often held up as the epitome of opposition to aggressive U.S. foreign policy,
acknowledged the existence of WMDs: ―You know, the French know and
have acknowledged to the Bush Administration that indeed Saddam does have
weapons of mass destruction, but they just think, well, we don‘t want to do
anything about it now.‖61 This statement contains two important implications:
WMDs must exist if the French acknowledge them, and the French are foolish
for not wanting to take action.
News anchors, who at first seemed objective in their questioning, were
often won over by panelists who confidently proclaimed belief in WMDs.
For example, when former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger was
interviewed on Hannity & Colmes,62 Alan Colmes asserted that weapons
inspections and neighboring countries were capable of containing Saddam
Hussein. Weinberger disagreed:
Well he isn‘t being contained, because all of the promises
he made at the end of the Gulf War he‘s broken one after the
other, including throwing the United Nations inspectors out
now four or five years without any inspection whatever. . . .
The longer we wait, the more we engage in worthless
inspections, in accepting more worthless promises, the more
danger there is, because he‘s moving toward—as Colin
said—moving toward the acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction, and many of them he has.63
Weinberger was reinforcing Colin Powell‘s assertions to the U.N. Security
Council.
In response, Colmes (the liberal voice in the Hannity–Colmes team) tried
to make the point that the Bush Administration did not know that the trucks
depicted in aerial photographs of Iraq shown by Powell during his speech
actually contained either the alleged WMDs or the parts used to manufacture
them. Colmes said, ―We saw pictures of trucks. We don‘t know what‘s in
those trucks, necessarily. . . . And some of the pictures looked very pretty, but
we don‘t know what‘s going on in those bunkers, we don‘t know what‘s going
on in those trucks.‖64 Weinberger responded,
That‘s exactly the point. We don‘t know what‘s going on
in them.
Now Colin showed that these are trucks

61.
62.
63.
64.

Special Report with Brit Hume, supra note 34.
Hannity & Colmes (Fox News television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003).
Id.
Id.

130

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:113

. . . are mobile laboratories. You can‘t open up each one.
There are 40,000 or 50,000 trucks that look just like this
on the roads of Iraq every day, and that means you have to
take somebody‘s word they are not containing this and that
they have disarmed. And you can‘t take the word of a liar.
You can‘t have a diplomatic solution with a liar. It‘s just
really as simple as that.65
At this point, Colmes conceded, ―Mr. Secretary, I don‘t dispute that he‘s
evil, he‘s a bad guy, he‘s a dictator, he needs to be watched, he needs to be
contained. He should have his weapons of mass destruction removed.‖66
With that, Colmes accepted the contentions of Powell, Weinberger, and the
Bush Administration that Saddam Hussein was manufacturing WMDs.
Well after the fact, the U.S. Senate released a report detailing intelligence
errors that were reflected in Powell‘s speech. This was after ―State
Department analysts found dozens of factual problems in drafts of his
speech,‖67 leading to the removal of twenty-eight of the thirty-eight identified
errors and distortions. Even Powell himself admitted, ―It turned out that the
sourcing was inaccurate and wrong, and in some cases deliberately
misleading, and for that I am disappointed and I regret it.‖68 Powell referred
to his speech as a ―blot‖ on his record.69 Based on the numerous documented
factual errors in Powell‘s presentation and in various drafts of his speech, the
Senate report concluded that Bush Administration officials were overly eager
to provide justification to go to war with Iraq.70
D. Summary of CNN and Fox News Coverage
Coverage of the period surrounding Colin Powell‘s speech to the United
Nations Security Council largely supported the Bush Administration‘s take on
the issues of the al-Qaeda connection and Iraqi WMDs. Source and panelist
selection was heavily dominated by official sources and mainstream
journalists. In fact, Colin Powell himself was interviewed by Tony Snow,
who later went to work as press secretary in the Bush White House.71 Video
clips of President Bush and Colin Powell were often used to lead stories and
panel discussions, and were frequently integrated into the middle of such
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Greg Miller, Flaws Cited in Powell’s U.N. Speech on Iraq, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 2004, at
A1.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
20/20 (ABC television broadcast Sept. 9, 2005).
Miller, supra note 67.
Fox News Sunday (Fox News television broadcast Feb. 9, 2003).
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programming. Most of the coverage consisted of roundtable discussions with
various officials, journalists, and experts. Hard news reporting was relatively
rare. In essence, this led to relatively monolithic coverage that supported the
ultimate decision to go to war in Iraq.
The opposing viewpoints that did appear were most often the opinions of
Iraqi officials and journalists. When domestic skeptics did appear, their
opinions were isolated and marginalized. Domestic skeptics were virtually
non-existent on Fox News. The oppositional viewpoints expressed on CNN,
such as those of Democratic Congressman Dennis Kucinich, were buried
amongst a multitude of opinions in support of Powell. David Albright, a
former United Nations weapons inspector who evaluated Powell‘s evidence
with a critical eye, questioned Powell‘s conclusion that the Iraqis were buying
aluminum tubes to be used as centrifuges for the production of nuclear bombs:
―[T]he administration has made the case, particularly in the fall, that . . . the
only use for these tubes [was] for gas centrifuge. I think that‘s been
challenged by many gas centrifuge experts.‖72 Opinions such as Albright‘s
were available, but the television media rarely used them.
CNN presented results of a poll taken right after Powell‘s speech that
indicated that the American people may have actually been more skeptical of
the Bush Administration than the journalists were. ―Forty-nine percent of us,
almost half of all Americans believe that the President would knowingly
present evidence that he knew was not accurate in order to build his case and
fifty-eight percent of us believe that the Bush Administration would conceal
evidence that goes [against] their position.‖73
IV. NORMATIVE IDEALS AND JOURNALISTIC PRACTICE
A. Constraints on Journalistic Practice
Questions must be asked about why the media failed to play a more active
role as the fourth estate in preventing the headlong rush into Iraq. One such
question is why was the media not more aggressive in evaluating assertions
made by the Bush Administration regarding the presence of al-Qaeda and
WMDs in Iraq. Opinion polls showed that the public believed these
assertions—a misperception that persisted among a significant portion of the
public—long after it became clear that these claims were inaccurate. So, why
didn‘t the media take a more critical role in evaluating these claims? And,
what happened to the normative goals of providing information from diverse
viewpoints and of ferreting out the truth?
The answers to these questions may be linked to several significant
72. Live Event/Special, supra note 22.
73. Crossfire (CNN television broadcast Feb. 5, 2003).
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constraints on media practice. First, the media operate with limited resources.
In recent years, these constraints have radically reshaped the practice of
journalism. News organizations like CNN and Fox News are doing less
original reporting, opting instead for the ―talk show politics‖ model, which is
far cheaper to produce. It is relatively inexpensive to put a host in the studio
with several guests and to engage them in the discussion of issues.
Developing questions and booking guests requires far less energy and
resources than the careful research and legwork that goes into producing
investigative news packages. In this case, rather than doing thorough
investigations of the contentions about Iraq‘s ties to al-Qaeda and WMDs, it
was much more efficient to pull out the journalistic rolodex and invite guests
to the studio.
Additionally, it is important to consider what types of guests are invited
and used as credible sources of information. Patterns in guest invitations and
source use follow the lines of power, giving disproportionate voice to high
government officials. Of crucial significance are not just the sources that
supply information, but also the sources who explain the news as pundits,74 a
fact clearly evident in the CNN and Fox News coverage. Not only are these
sources powerful in shaping the meanings of issues and events, but the
audience also may see them as being more objective than original sources,
though these sources are rarely neutral. As is typical with many such stories,
CNN and Fox News coverage was heavily saturated with sources and
panelists who represented the Bush Administration, or who were hesitant to
criticize the Bush Administration in light of the rally effects75 of the postSeptember 11th context.
The journalistic practice of objectivity also creates conditions for coverage
that support the interests of the presidential administration. Journalists are
socialized with the ideology of objectivity,76 which values the ideal of
neutrality. However, in practice, whatever an administration official says is
considered by definition legitimate news, and accorded a high degree of
credibility. Critics, particularly those who come from outside the power
structure, are treated more skeptically. Journalists avoid giving too much
attention to radical criticism for fear of being perceived as less-than-objective
partisans. In the case of CNN and Fox News coverage, journalists were quick
to applaud Colin Powell on his performance at the United Nations, but
hesitant to give significant airtime to those who challenged his assertions.

74. See LAWRENCE C. SOLEY, THE NEWS SHAPERS: THE SOURCES WHO EXPLAIN THE NEWS
18–20 (1992).
75. See JOHN E. MUELLER, WAR, PRESIDENTS AND PUBLIC OPINION 53 (1973).
76. GAYE TUCHMAN, MAKING NEWS: A STUDY IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 83
(1978).
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B. What Happened to Normative Ideals?
In light of the forces that constrain press performance, we can assess
journalistic practice with respect to the normative ideals in such conflict
situations. As a point of departure, this Article adopts two of the most
important normative ideals that media in democratic systems should strive to
uphold: (1) the provision of a forum for diverse perspectives on important
issues, including both domestic and international conflicts, and (2) the
performance of the role of independent arbitrators to explain and evaluate
various positions, including the contentions made by various parties to such
conflicts, to determine, where possible, what constitutes factual truth.
The analysis of media performance in the period leading up to the Iraq
War illustrates the notion that these ideals are simultaneously complementary
and contradictory. On one hand, both ideals involve providing information to
the public to enhance learning, deliberation, and public opinion formation.
However, in practice, these ideals often contradict each other. For example,
should journalists continue to provide balanced perspectives on contested
public issues when the truth is obvious? How should journalists respond in a
social conflict when the facts clearly favor one party to a conflict?
This analysis of CNN and Fox News coverage reveals that the way these
news organizations applied these normative ideals was largely dysfunctional
and ultimately incendiary to the Iraq conflict. Throughout the post-September
11th period, the American media was quick to accept Bush Administration
assertions as truth. Their heavy reliance on Administration sources treated the
al-Qaeda connection and Iraqi WMDs as virtually established facts. As the
U.S. intervention in Iraq yielded information that contradicted these
assertions, the media was hesitant to abandon their concern for providing
balanced viewpoints, treating the Bush Administration assertions as viable
even in the absence of supporting evidence.
Ultimately, these normative standards were applied in the reverse of what
we might consider a logical order. In a conflict situation, it would be
desirable for the media to provide competing perspectives until such a time
when the preponderance of the evidence indicates that one position actually
represents the truth. In the case of Iraq, journalistic practice reversed this
process in the sense that the Bush Administration ―truth‖ was accepted early
on, and alternative viewpoints were added to the mix only after the emergence
of countervailing evidence.
C. Media Support for Bush Administration Assertions
What accounts for this reversal in what would seem to be a logical order?
Literature on the role of mass media in international conflict situations
provides some answers to this question. In the early stages, coverage
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conformed to what Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky call the ―Propaganda
Model,‖ in which support for official Administration policy is strong.77 The
parameters of the truth were narrowed in a manner that paved the way for
relatively uncontested engagement in Iraq. A variety of factors have been
identified as contributing to support for a presidential administration during
international conflicts. Considerable research has shown that during
international conflicts, the media—as well as members of the public—tend to
rally around the presidential administration and its policies.78 This reflects the
general tendency of external conflicts to strengthen internal cohesion and to
reduce dissent. Beyond these general social principles, there are also factors
specific to newsgathering and dissemination routines of contemporary
mainstream media, often referred to as ―transmission belt‖ journalism.
Simply put, relaying information from official sources without investing the
necessary time and resources to investigate its veracity or to seek alternative
perspectives and relevant facts is an economically efficient journalistic
practice. In this case, the upshot was the extended resilience of Bush
Administration contentions.
As the Iraqi conflict unfolded and these contentions did not hold up,
media performance reverted to the practice of ―he said/she said‖ journalism,
in which both sides—for and against engagement in Iraq—were treated with
equal regard and relatively little effort was dedicated to the search for the
truth. As such, the conflict with Iraq was allowed to fester unbound by
evidence. This practice has been encouraged by the resource crisis that
confronts news organizations. For example, it is considerably cheaper for the
television news networks to adopt the talk show and infotainment formats
than to engage in more traditional investigative reporting. This practice is
also supported by the journalistic ideology of objectivity, in which news
media ritualistically present two sides of issues to maintain the illusion of
neutrality and balance to avoid appearing partisan by presenting one side as
being factually correct. In situations in which the facts tilt toward one side in
a conflict, the rationale of objectivity becomes a crutch that disables the
search for the truth. In this case, the official policy line was maintained long
after it was no longer factually viable.
V. CONSEQUENCES FOR SOCIAL CONFLICT
In reviewing these journalistic practices and the content of their coverage,
it is important to consider their consequences in terms of both the public and
the dynamics of this conflict. The scope of the negative consequences of the
77. EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA 1–2 (1988).
78. MUELLER, supra note 75, at 250.
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U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq is difficult to fully comprehend. For
example, tracing the extent to which the massive expenditure of U.S.
resources in Iraq has contributed to the current global economic peril is
obviously complicated. In addition, it is hard to say whether the massive
military deployment in Iraq has hampered efforts to capture the parties
responsible for the September 11th terrorist attacks, who may still be
operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Yet other consequences are fairly
clear. To date, there have been 4,352 U.S. soldiers killed in Iraq and 31,529
wounded, with an additional 318 fatalities among soldiers from other
contributing nations;79 moreover, there have been more than 50,000 fatalities
among Iraqi security forces and civilians.80 It is also clear that U.S.
involvement in Iraq has been an international relations disaster for U.S.
foreign policy.
In terms of public knowledge, it is evident that large segments of the U.S.
population accepted the assertions of the Bush Administration. Data from the
Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of
Maryland show that the belief in the al-Qaeda connection to the pre-war Iraqi
government was at 52% in 2004 and 49% in 2006.81 Similarly, in October
2004, 49% of the American public believed that the pre-war Iraqi government
possessed WMDs,82 despite the fact that no such weapons were discovered,
much less used during the war. In March 2006, this belief was still at 41%.83
Collectively, such beliefs appear to be a major contributor to support for
U.S. engagement in the Iraq conflict. In 2006, support for the war was at 62%
among people who believed that Iraq played a direct role in the September
11th attacks, while it was only at 15% among those who felt there was no
such connection.84 Similarly, the perception that going to war in Iraq was the
correct decision was at 85% for people who believed that Iraq possessed
actual WMDs, but only 5% among people who did not share that belief.85
These observations, and the fact that support for the Iraq War declined
markedly over time as Americans became aware that the al-Qaeda
connections and WMDs did not exist, point to the fact that U.S. engagement

79. United States Department of Defense, Casualty Update (Oct. 16, 2009),
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf.
80. See Hannah Fischer, CRS Report for Congress, Iraqi Civilian Deaths Estimates (Aug. 27,
2008), http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22537.pdf.
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in the conflict was predicated on false beliefs. The mainstream media‘s
failure to play an adjudicating role in separating fact from fiction inherently
makes them complicit in the conflict and its disastrous consequences.
Questions might be raised as to whether the case of the build-up to the
Iraq War was an idiosyncratic event, or whether it reflects a common pattern
in the dynamics of such international conflicts. Historical evidence suggests
the latter. For example, the limited scope of viewpoint diversity can be
observed in the case of the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, in which the American public was presented with the rather
uniform view that U.S. actions were justified. Media coverage exhibited a
similar pattern of monolithic support for the Vietnam War, at least until
leaders within the power structure and large segments of the American public
turned against the war.86 Similarly, mainstream media coverage of the 1983
Soviet downing of KAL007 followed the official U.S. policy version of
events; for example, the Reagan Administration‘s claim that the Soviets
intentionally shot down a passenger airliner persisted as the dominant view
long after cockpit transcripts revealed that the Soviet fighter pilots had no idea
about the nature of the target.87 These and other examples point to the fact
that this is a common pattern.
VI. REESTABLISHING JOURNALISTIC PRACTICE IN
SOCIAL CONFLICT SITUATIONS
In light of this discussion, this Article concludes by examining a model
that might be used to frame the normative role that media should play in such
conflicts. If we were to consider conflicts that center around issue
controversies over factual disputes (from local to international conflicts) as
courtroom trials, with the public sitting as jury, the role of mass media should
be to serve as the judge. The media should start by identifying the relevant
parties involved—not only the major players, but also the various publics
affected by conflict outcomes. They should then present competing
viewpoints and perspectives as accurately and as thoroughly as possible.
When claims are made, the media should assemble and evaluate evidence that
is germane to the dispute. Finally, they should render decisions only when
warranted in light of preponderance of evidence, regardless of the status of the
parties involved with respect to the existing power structure.
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